IS THE AI A SAFETY COMPONENT?
Annex III classifies AI intended to be used as a safety component in the management and operation of critical digital infrastructure, road traffic, or the supply of water, gas, heating or electricity as high-risk.
Critical-infrastructure AI is not high-risk merely because it is important. The key question is whether the system functions as a safety component in the management or operation of critical infrastructure—or falls under another Article 6 high-risk route. Once consequence can propagate into physical systems, continuity, fallback, authority and evidence become operational requirements, not paperwork.
Annex III classifies AI intended as safety components in critical digital infrastructure, road traffic, or the supply of water, gas, heating or electricity as high-risk. The Regulation distinguishes these safety components from components used solely for cybersecurity and treats serious irreversible disruption of critical infrastructure as a serious incident.
Start with the actual system, role, use case and evidence boundary. The same regulation can produce different obligations for different actors and systems.
Annex III classifies AI intended to be used as a safety component in the management and operation of critical digital infrastructure, road traffic, or the supply of water, gas, heating or electricity as high-risk.
The Regulation explains that safety components directly protect the physical integrity of critical infrastructure or the health and safety of persons and property. Components used solely for cybersecurity are not treated as safety components for this Annex III route.
For critical infrastructure, model error can become operational consequence. Preserve fallback modes, human override, safe-state logic, thresholds, alarms, maintenance evidence, incident records and the boundaries that prevent silent escalation.
Preserve intended purpose, deployment location, system and model version, sensor/data sources, authority, operating limits, human oversight, risk controls, serious-incident history, material changes and revalidation decisions.
The goal is not merely to reach an answer. It is to preserve what facts, evidence, scope and limitations supported that answer at that time.
Separate forecasting, optimisation, cybersecurity, maintenance prediction, dispatch, safety monitoring, shutdown protection and control. Not every AI system used by a critical-infrastructure operator is automatically high-risk.
Test the Annex III critical-infrastructure route and, where relevant, Article 6(1) product-safety routes under Annex I legislation. Preserve which classification route actually supports the result.
Connect risk management, technical documentation, logging, human oversight, accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity, alarms, fallback, override and maintenance evidence to the consequence-bearing function.
A model update, new sensor source, changed threshold, network expansion, control-system integration, operating-policy change or new infrastructure dependency can invalidate the prior risk and evidence state.
Choose the smallest operating tier that fits the portfolio today. Upgrade when system count, team size or governance scope actually requires it.
Keep a living system-level evidence record with obligations, gaps, versions and revalidation state.
START EVIDENCE PASSPORT →Coordinate evidence, owners, documentation, incidents and team compliance work in one governed workspace.
START COMPLIANCE WORKSPACE →Operate broader high-risk, GPAI, FRIA, post-market and material-change governance across a growing portfolio.
START GOVERNANCE PRO →Run institutional governance with expanded users, authority workflows, examiner rooms and portfolio reporting.
START INSTITUTION →Use the free classifier to establish the system, intended purpose, possible actor role, EU exposure and unresolved facts. When continuing evidence infrastructure is needed, paid access begins at $19 per month. Independent human readiness review remains a separate service.
No. Annex III specifically targets AI intended to be used as a safety component in the management and operation of critical digital infrastructure, road traffic, or the supply of water, gas, heating or electricity.
The Regulation describes safety components as systems used to directly protect the physical integrity of critical infrastructure or the health and safety of persons and property. Examples in the recitals include water-pressure monitoring and fire-alarm control systems in cloud-computing centres.
Not under this Annex III safety-component route when the component is intended solely for cybersecurity purposes. Other legal or product routes may still apply, so the exact function must be classified.
Preserve system identity and version, intended purpose, safety function, data and sensor provenance, authority, operating thresholds, human oversight, fallback and override logic, logs, incidents, maintenance, material changes, limitations and revalidation history.
The Regulation defines a serious incident to include a serious and irreversible disruption of the management or operation of critical infrastructure. Providers of high-risk systems are subject to serious-incident reporting duties under the Act.
No. TA-14 can preserve the classification basis, safety evidence, authority, operating limits, gaps, change history and revalidation state. It does not itself provide legal advice, conformity assessment, certification or regulatory approval.
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